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O
ne of the major areas of the
economy that has received renewed
focus in recent times has been the
financial sector. Within the broad ambit
of the financial sector, the banking sector
has been the cynosure of academia and
policymakers alike. Among the various
reasons attributable to the resurgence of
interest in banking, the worldwide trend
towards de-regulation of the financial
sector, ascendancy of free market philoso-
phy and the growing number, breadth and
severity of bouts of financial distress that
have plagued several economies since the
1980s have been dominant. With concerns
about financial stability emerging to the
forefront of policy challenges now facing
central banks worldwide, it is being in-
creasingly realised that promoting healthy
financial institutions, especially banks,
remains a crucial policy challenge for all
central banks worldwide. In consonance
of this trend, the traditional face of bank-
ing has also been undergoing a change
from being a mere intemediator to becom-
ing a provider of quick, cost-effective and
consumer-centric services. Not surprisingly
therefore, the banking sector in most
emerging economies, including India, is
passing through challenging times.
Process of liberalisation of the economy
initiated in India since 1991-92, aimed at
raising the allocative efficiency of avail-
able savings, increasing the return on
investments and promoting, accelerated
growth and development of the real sector.
Towards this end, wide-ranging reforms
were undertaken across the entire gamut
of the financial system in order to promote
a diversified, efficient and competitive
financial system [Rangarajan 1998]. The
thrust of the process has been to cut costs
and raise the productive efficiency of the
banking sector as a whole.
Internationally, there has been a consid-
erable amount of research examining the
productive efficiency for the banking
industry for several countries, viz, United
States [Bauer et al 1998], Norway [Berg
et al 1992], Thailand [Leightner and Lovell
1998] and Korea [Gilbert and Wilson
1998]; not much evidence in this regard
has been forthcoming for the Indian bank-
ing sector. It is widely recognised that
India is one of the fastest growing econo-
mies in the present decade [Jalan 2000],
with the growth engine propelled to a large
extent, by a vibrant banking sector. At a
time when the financial sector has been
significantly liberalised, it is important to
examine as to whether the productivity of
banks has concomitantly improved as well.
Such insights can provide useful guidance
to policy-makers towards understanding
the efficacy of the reform process, particu-
larly on the banking sector.
In the light of the aforesaid discussion,
the present paper seeks to examine the
interrelationships among risk, capital and
productivity change of the public-sector
banking sector in India. While the relation-
ship between capital and risk, especially
for US banks, has been extensively studied
[Shrieves and Dahl 1992; Jacques and
Nigro 1997] and even their interrelation-
ship with operating efficiency has been
explored [Kwan and Eisenbis 1997],
limited evidence is available on their re-
lationship with productivity change. There
are reasons to believe that both risk and
productivity might be endogenously deter-
mined, so that such a situation is best
examined in a simultaneous equation setup.
In a recent study, Leightner and Lovell
(1998) using two different specifications
of the provision of bank services showed
that total factor productivity varied mark-
edly under two different objectives. Illus-
tratively, when the direct objective of profit
maximisation by the banks was consid-
ered, factor productivity increased sharply;
in contrast, when the indirect objective of
facilitating growth while safeguarding
safety and soundness of the banking sys-
tem was taken into consideration, produc-
tivity growth exhibited a decline. Such
differing objectives, not surprisingly, have
differing implications for risk-taking
behaviour by banks. Under the first sce-
nario, risk-taking tends to be dictated by
the individual bank’s profitability consid-
erations, which, in turn, will impinge on
bank productivity, while in case of the
latter, risk-taking will be largely governed
by financial stability considerations of the
central bank, and to that extent, will impinge
indirectly upon productivity.
From the standpoint of a developing
country, the interplay among capital, risk
and productivity might not be necessarily
unambiguous. For one, banking systems
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in developing countries still tend to be
predominantly government owned, so that
any such relationship needs to take cog-
nisance of this fact. To provide an ex-
ample, as at end 1998, share of SOBs in
India were 82 per cent. The comparable
figures for China, Indonesia and Brazil
during the same period were 99 per cent,
85 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively
[Hawkins and Turner 1999]. Second,
prudential norms also differ widely across
countries, so that studies on such banking
behaviour in one country might not pro-
vide consistent inferences about the same
in another country. More importantly, even
within a country, not all banks would be
equally well placed to meet the prudential
norms. This brings into prominence the
concept of regulatory pressure that such
banks face towards attaining such stan-
dards. Finally, several countries have di-
rected credit programmes, meant to pro-
vide credit at concessional rates to the
neglected sectors of the economy, so that
any analysis would need to factor such
considerations into account.
The purpose of the study can presently
be outlined. The aim of the study is to
examine the interrelationships among risk,
capital and productivity for the PSBs in
India. In contrast to the standard interme-
diation approach or production approach
towards determining the bank’s choice of
inputs and outputs, we follow Leightner
and Lovell (1998) in assuming that com-
mercial banks have a growth objective,
while the central bank seeks to ensure
soundness of the banking system, in ad-
dition to ensuring higher economic growth.
This approach allows for the specification
of two differing sets of outputs and a
common set of inputs and subsequently,
we examine empirically the effects on risk
and capital when banks either pursue their
objectives in isolation or alternately, in-
ternalize the objectives of the central bank.
The analysis reveals that capital adequacy
has a negative and significant effect on
asset quality when the PSBs are consid-
ered in totality. Secondly, it is observed
that non-performing assets (NPAs) play a
major role in influencing capital levels for
the small banks as also for the PSBs as
a whole, reiterating the mutually reinforc-
ing relation between credit risk and finan-
cial leverage. Thirdly, as regards produc-
tivity change, it is observed that depending
upon whether the objective of productivity
is growth or growth with stability consid-
erations, capital and NPAs remain crucial
factors in influencing productivity. Finally,
regulatory pressure, both with regard to
capital and NPAs play a significant role
in influencing the capital adequacy and
asset quality of PSBs.
The rest of the paper is structured as
follows. In Section II, a brief history of
the financial liberalisation and bank regu-
lation in India are discussed, which pro-
vides the backdrop for the subsequent
empirical exercise. Section III describes
the model specification. The discussion of
the results is contained in Section IV. The
final section syncopates the concluding
remarks.
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The scheduled commercial banking
system comprises of foreign banks oper-
ating in India, in addition to Indian banks
in the public and the private sectors and
the regional rural banks (RRBs). The two
rounds of nationalisation – first in 1969
of 14 major private sector banks with
deposit liability of Rs 0.50 billion or more,
and thereafter in 1980, of six major private
sector banks with deposits not less than
Rs 2 billion1– led to the creation of PSBs
with nearly 92 per cent of assets as at end-
March 1991. While there were several
private sector and foreign banks function-
ing at that time, their activities were highly
restricted through branch licensing and
entry regulation norms.
All commercial banks, whether public,
private or foreign, are regulated by the
central bank, the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI). A process of liberalisation of the
financial sector was initiated in 1992, which
aimed at creating a more diversified, pro-
fitable, efficient and resilient banking sys-
tem, based on the recommendations of the
Narasimham Committee on Financial
Sector Reforms (1991). The underlying
philosophy was to make the banking sys-
tem more responsive to changes in the
market environment and to that end, en-
gendered a shift in the role of the RBI from
micro-management of bank’s operations
to macro-governance.
The reforms sought to improve bank
profitability by lowering pre-emptions
(through reductions in the cash reserve and
statutory liquidity ratios)2 and to strengthen
the banking system through institution of
8 per cent capital adequacy norms, in
addition to income recognition, asset clas-
sification and provisioning requirements
in line with international best practices.
Competition was sought to be promoted
through entry of new banks in the private
sector and more liberal entry of foreign
banks. While regulations relating to inter-
est rate policy, prudential norms and re-
serve requirements have been applied
uniformly across bank groups, priority
sector credit requirements are quite varied
for different categories of banks. Illustra-
tively, while the public sector and private
sector banks are required to allocate 40 per
cent of their credit to priority sectors
(comprising, agriculture, small-scale in-
dustry, transport operators, small business,
etc), the same for foreign banks was fixed
at 32 per cent. These amounts, for both
the state-owned/private and the foreign
banks are inclusive of several sub-targets,
the former comprising a sub-target of 18
per cent for agriculture, while the latter
consists of a sub-target of 10 per cent for
export3 and 10 per cent for small-scale
industries.
Until 1991-92, all PSBs were fully owned
by the government.4 After the reforms
process was initiated, these banks were
allowed the access the capital markets to
Table  1:  Summary  of  the  Banking  Industry Table  1:  Summary  of  the  Banking  Industry Table  1:  Summary  of  the  Banking  Industry Table  1:  Summary  of  the  Banking  Industry Table  1:  Summary  of  the  Banking  Industry
(1990-91  to  2000-01)
Year/Bank  Group 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01
Pub Pvt Forgn Pub Pvt Forgn Pub Pvt Forgn
Number  of  Banks 28 25 23 27 35 29 27 32 41
Total  Deposits
(Rs    billion) 2087.3 94.3 84.5 3908.2 361.7 306.1 8593.8 1349.2 591.9
Total  credit
(Rs  billion) 1305.7 49.5 50.6 2075.4 219.3 225.0 4146.3 672.1 429.9
Credit-deposit  ratio 0.63 0.52 0.60 0.53 0.61 0.75 0.48 0.50 0.73
Share  of
  Total  Deposits 92.1 4.2 3.7 85.4 7.9 6.7 81.6 12.8 5.6
  Total  Credit 92.9 3.5 3.6 82.4 8.7 8.9 79.0 12.8 8.2
  Total  Income
  (Rs    billion) 240.4 10.4 15.3 536.7 71.8 74.99 1034.9 163.9 119.8
  Net  Profit  (Rs    billion) 4.7 0.4 1.5 -3.3 15.9 7.4 43.2 12.3 10.2
Notes: (SOBs):  State-owned  Banks;  (Pvt):  Private  Sector  Banks;  (Forgn):  Foreign  Banks.Economic and Political Weekly February 2, 2002 439
raise up to 49 per cent of their equity. Till
2000-01, as many as 12 PSBs accessed the
capital markets and raised an amount ag-
gregating Rs 64 billion. The management
of nationalised banks is under the purview
of the ministry of finance which has its
representatives on the board of directors.
The management of SBI, on the other
hand, is under the RBI, which has its
representative on its board of directors.
Evidence of competitive pressures on
the Indian banking industry is seen from
the decline in the five bank asset concen-
tration ratio5  from 0.51 in 1991-92 to 0.44
in 1995-96 and thereafter to 0.41 in 2000-
01 and by the increasing number of private
and foreign banks (Table 1).6
The performance of PSBs has become
more responsive to changes in the market-
place, with growing emphasis on profit-
ability as an indicator of performance as
opposed to non-commercial considerations
in the pre-reform era. Illustratively, there
was a distinct improvement in the net profit
of PSBs (from 4.6 billion in 1992-93 to
Rs 43.2 billion in 2000-01). Reflecting the
efficiency of the intermediation process,
there has been a decline in the spread
between the borrowing and lending rates
as attested by the ratio of net interest
income to total assets from 3.20 per cent
in 1990-91 to 2.84 per cent in 2000-01.
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The prior literature suggests that bank
risk-taking might be dependent, among
others, upon productivity change. The
managerial discretion in risk-taking is
partially dependent on the quality of
management. As a consequence, an effi-
cient bank with a superior management
might be better placed in assuming addi-
tional risks vis-a-vis a less efficient one,
ceteris paribus. This however needs to be
tempered by fact that an efficient banking
firm, in an attempt to protect its franchise
value, might be less inclined to assume
greater risks than a less efficient one. The
relationship is further compounded by
agency problems between management and
shareholders. If, for instance, entrenched
management is associated with low pro-
ductivity, it is not altogether clear whether
the relation between productivity and bank
risk is positive [Saunders et al 1990] or
negative [Gorton and Rosen 1995].
At the same time, bank risk might impinge
upon productivity. Risks may be costly to
manage, since a high-risk firm might
require more inputs to produce a given
level of output as compared with a banking
firm which assumes less risk. Put differ-
ently, while the attainment of a given level
of productivity might be cost-effective, it
might be difficult to increase the same, in
view of the problems of high-risk loans
that might creep into the loan sanctioning
process. This, in its wake, implies a nega-
tive effect of bank risk on productivity.
The nature of interplay between risk and
productivity implies that it may be best
modelled within a simultaneous equation
framework. While studies examining the
interplay between capital and portfolio risk
have been considered in literature [Shrieves
and Dahl 1992], little work has been
forthcoming on the examination of the
relationship between capital and credit risk
and its interaction with productivity.
Two sources of bank risk are considered
in this study. These include credit risk and
leverage. Credit risk is the risk of default
of the assets of the banking firm, consist-
ing primarily of loans and government
securities.7 Leverage, on the other hand,
refers to the amount of borrowing relative
to the level of capital provided by share-
holders. Since a banking firm can achieve
a certain level of overall risk exposure by
convex combinations of credit risk and
financial leverage, these two types of
bank risk are modelled as simultaneously
determined. In the present study, credit
risk is measured by the ratio of net non-
performing loans to net advances (NNPA).8
Financial leverage, on the other hand, is
measured by the ratio of capital to risk
weighted assets (CRAR).
The crucial issue in this context is the
measurement of productivity change. There
has been long-standing disagreement over
what banks produce and what resources
are consumed in the process. Three ap-
proaches have come to dominate the lit-
erature: the asset (or intermediation) ap-
proach, the user cost approach and the
value added (or production) approach. All
these approaches utilise generally differ-
ent, but overlapping sets of inputs and
outputs. The present analysis of defining
inputs and outputs of Indian commercial
banks has been motivated by Leightner
and Lovell (1998).
In the Indian context, the commercial
banks, especially the public sector banks,
serve manifold purposes. As a business
entity, while they have a profit-maximising
objective, given the governmental con-
cerns for ensuring allocation of credit
to neglected sectors of the economy
(e g, small scale industries, agriculture,
transport operators, small business, etc),
they have to serve a social objective as
well. The central bank, on the other hand,
has a regulatory objective of fostering
equitable economic growth, whilst addres-
sing the concerns of financial stability.
We define two different models of
measuring productivity change, depend-
ing on the choice of the set of inputs. When
one has panel data, as in the present study,
one may use Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) like linear programming approach
and a (input or output based) Malmquist
total factor productivity (TFP) index to
measure productivity change. DEA in-
volves the use of linear programming
methods to construct a non-parametric
piecewise surface (or frontier) over the
data, so as to be able to calculate efficien-
cies relative to this surface.
Suppose we have data on K inputs and
M outputs for each of N DMU’s. For the
i th DMU, these are represented by the
vectors xi and yi, respectively. The K × N
input matrix × and the M × N output matrix
Y represent the data for all N DMUs. [Fare
et al (1994)[ specify an output-based
Malmquist productivity change index9















This represents the productivity of the
production point (xt+1, yt+1) relative to the
production point (xt, yt); (x, y) indicates the
vector of inputs and outputs. A value greater
than 1 will indicate positive TFP growth
from period t to period t+1. This index is,
in fact, the geometric mean of two output-
based Malmquist TFP indices. One index
uses period t technology, and the other
uses periods t+1 technology. To calculate
the index, one needs to calculate the two-
component distance function, which in-
volves four linear programming problems.
For instance, assuming constant returns to
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Similarly, the other distance functions
can be calculated.
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For the first model, we specify inputs as
deposits, borrowings, fixed assets (capi-
tal), while an additional input (provisions
and contingencies) has been added to define
the second model. The additional input is
intended to capture the cost of risk-taking,
a recurrent problem of the banking sector
in India. The selection of this variable is
warranted against the background of the
objective of the central bank of preserving
financial stability as opposed to merely
macro-stability. In this study, we have
assumed that commercial banks in India
seek to pursue the broader objective of
fostering economic growth. Towards that
end, we specify a common set of two out-
puts for both sets of models: bank credit and
investments. In order to mitigate the price
effects, the relevant variables have been
deflated by a uniform GDP deflator. Ac-
cordingly, we estimate two different indices
of productivity for each bank separately
and denote them as GR1 and GR2.
Summing up the aforesaid discussion,
in the present set-up, NNPA, CAPITAL
and PRODUCTIVITY (GR1 and GR2)
represent the three endogenous variables
in each of the three equations. The model
is closed by including exogenous variables
that have explanatory power for each of
the above endogenous variables. It is to
these variables that we turn next.
The NNPA is expected to be related to
the composition of the loan portfolio, since
different asset categories have different
default characteristics. Therefore, in the
NNPA equation, we include priority sector
loans (as ratios of total loans) as a separate
variable. Evidence in the Indian context
seem to suggest that, for the PSBs, the
share of non-performing loans obtaining
from priority sector declined from over 48
per cent in March 1996 to around 46.2 per
cent in March 2001 [RBI 2001]. Since
loans to priority sector have been pre-
scribed not to exceed the Prime Lending
Rate (the rate charged to the borrowers of
the bank with highest rating), it remains
to be examined whether higher priority
sector loans lead to higher NNPA. The
effects of loan growth on the quantity of
bad loans are controlled by using the one-
year loan growth rate (ADVGR). To allow
for the possibility of a U-shaped relation
between loan growth and bad loan, the
square of loan growth term (ADVGRSQ)
has also been included as a separate vari-
able to explain bad loan. In line with the
analysis of Jacques and Nigro (1997), we
introduce the concept of regulatory pres-
sure both with regard to capital and NPAs.
As regards NPAs, the union budget of the
government for 1998-99 provided certain
functional autonomy to the PSBs with
regard to their personnel management
policies. An important component of the
autonomy process included these banks
having a NNPA ratio not exceeding 9 per
cent, which we adopt as the benchmark for
computing regulatory pressure for NPAs.
Specifically, the regulatory pressure vari-
able equals the difference between the
inverse of the banks actual net NPA to net
advances ratio (NNPA) and the inverse of
the benchmark ratio of 9 per cent. Because
banks with NNPA above and below the
9 per cent stipulation may react differently,
this study partitioned regulatory pressure
into two variables: RPHNPA and
RPLNPA. RPHNPA equals (1/NNPA-1/9)
for all banks with a NNPA not less than
9 per cent, and zero otherwise. These banks
are under considerable pressure to lower
their NNPA. Therefore, RPHNPA should
have a positive effect on NNPA, because
one of the options available to banks to
meet the prescribed asset quality standards
is simply by cutting loan growth. The
reverse logic holds for banks with NNPA
less than 9 per cent. In this case, RPLNPA
is defined as (1/9-1/NNPA) for all banks
with NNPA not less than 9 per cent, and
zero otherwise. Finally, the effect of eco-
nomic conditions on non-performing
loans (ceteris paribus, non-performing
loans would tend to rise in bad times than
in good times) is controlled, using time
effect dummies.
In the second equation, the level of capital
is expected to be positively related to the
profitability of the banking firm, owing to
the plough back of earnings into reserves.10
This suggests the Return on Assets (RoA)
as a plausible explanatory variable to
explain CRAR. In addition, we control for
the effect of bank size on capital, by
including the natural logarithm of total
assets (SIZE). In order to capture the effects
of capital regulation, we include regula-
tory pressure variables, denoted by
RPHCRAR and RPLCRAR. In particular,
the focus is on the response of the PSBs
to the 8 per cent risk-based capital stan-
dards.11 In this case, RPHCRAR and
RPLCRAR signal the degree of regulatory
pressure brought about by the risk-based
capital standards on capital ratio. As with
regard to NPAs, the regulatory pressure
variable equals the difference between the
inverse of the bank’s total risk-based capital
ratio (CRAR) and the inverse of the regu-
latory minimum risk-based ratio of 8 per
cent and accordingly, this study partitioned
regulatory pressure into two variables:
RPHCRAR and RPLCRAR. In particular,
RPLCRAR equals (1/CRAR-1/8) for all
banks with a total risk-based capital ratio
less than 8 per cent, and zero otherwise.
These banks are under considerable pres-
sure to increase capital ratios. Therefore,
RPLCRAR should have a positive effect
on capital ratios, because one of the
options available to banks to meet the
prescribed capital standards is simply
raising capital.12
A second regulatory pressure variable,
RPHCRAR equals (1/8-1/CRAR) for all
banks with total risk-based ratio greater
than or equal to 8 per cent, zero otherwise.
Although banks with risk-based capital
ratios in excess of 8 per cent are not
explicitly constrained by the prescribed
capital standards, it might well happen that
the risk-based standards induce them to
reduce their ratios (the opportunity cost of
holding additional capital might be high).
Alternately, since banks must meet the
minimum prescribed standards on a con-
tinuous basis, the risk-based capital stan-
dards may cause banks to increase their
capital ratios (additional capital might act
as a cushion for some loans migrating into
non-performance). More importantly,
higher capital ratios might act as a signal-
ling device, both to the market and bank
regulators, that these banks are in compli-
ance and in the process, lead to an overall
reduction in regulatory costs.
Finally, in the PRODUCTIVITY equa-
tion, we control for the effect of loan
growth on efficiency by introducing two
loan growth variables: ADVGR and
ADVGRSQ. To the extent that a low to
moderate growth rate captures managerial
quality, while a high growth rate reflects
Table  2:  Summary  Statistics  –  Mean Table  2:  Summary  Statistics  –  Mean Table  2:  Summary  Statistics  –  Mean Table  2:  Summary  Statistics  –  Mean Table  2:  Summary  Statistics  –  Mean
Values  of  the  Variables Values  of  the  Variables Values  of  the  Variables Values  of  the  Variables Values  of  the  Variables
Variable Large Medium Small A l l
Bank-specific
Total  Asset 10.645 9.598 9.097 9.780
CRAR 10.18 8.263 11.462 9.968
NNPA 7.726 10.975 7.674 8.792
R O A 0.556 -0.0004 0.556 0.370
ADVGR 15.645 14.609 17.546 15.933
PRIOL 30.741 34.408 37.642 34.264
Productivity
G R 1 1.178 1.223 1.096 1.132
G R 2 1.188 1.116 1.096 1.133
Regulatory
RPHNPA 0.004 0.020 0.006 0.009
RPLNPA 0.032 0.029 0.061 0.041
RPHCRAR 0.023 0.020 0.032 0.025
RPLCRAR 0.081 0.019 0.003 0.034
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managerial entrenchment, the relation
between growth and efficiency might be
U-shaped. Finally, to control for the effect
of government ownership of the state-
owned banking system in India, we define
a variable, GOVT, which takes the value
one for that year (and for all subsequent
years), if a bank has made an equity issue
in the particular year and zero, otherwise.
In other words, GOVT intends to ascertain
whether the divestment of government
ownership in SOBs has had an influence
on PRODUCTIVITY. If, for example, the
relationship is negative, then one might
surmise that government ownership tends
to improve the productivity of the banking
sector. Reverse would be the case if the
relationship is positive.
I V I V I V I V I V
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Yearly data on PSBs from 1995-96
through 2000-01 is obtained from the
various issues of Statistical Tables Relat-
ing to Banks in India, the Report of Trend
and Progress of Banking in India and the
published annual audited accounts of
individual banks. The reason for the choice
of PSBs can be stated as follows. First,
PSBs comprised between 80 and 85 per
cent of the total assets of scheduled com-
mercial banks during this period. Second,
the PSBs group is sufficiently heteroge-
neous in terms of geographical location of
branches, product sophistication, techno-
logical orientation as well as their clientele
base, so that a study of PSBs suffices to
extract broad inferences about the inter-
relation between risk and productivity
change for the banking sector in India as
a whole. As it stands, the PSBs in India
comprise of the State Bank of India (SBI)
(in which the Reserve Bank of India is the
majority shareholder), seven associates of
SBI (the majority holding being with SBI)
and 19 nationalised banks (the majority
holding being with the government). The
final sample therefore comprises of 27
PSBs for the period 1995-96 to 2000-01.
The choice of the period is dictated by
several considerations. The first is the
availability of published data on the vari-
ables considered in the study. Second,
owing to the construction of the one-year
loan growth rate, the estimation period
covers the years 1995-96 through 2000-01.
Thirdly, the year 1995-96 marks the mid-
point of the ‘first generation’ reforms
programme initiated in 1991, so that it
would be useful to examine the efficacy
of banking policies on the behaviour of
different bank groups half-way through
the initiation of the reform process.
Summary statistics of the sample bank-
ing firms in each of the three size classes
as well as for PSBs as a whole for the
estimation period is reported in Table 2.
In order to account for the heterogeneity
within PSBs, the sample is broken down
into three size classes, based on their total
assets as at end-March 1996 (the first year
of the sample period). The three size classes
are defined as ‘small’, i e, those with total
assets less than or equal to Rs100 billion;
‘medium’, i e, those with assets exceeding
Rs100 billion, but less than or equal to
Rs150 billion; and finally, ‘large’, i e, those
with assets exceeding Rs150 billion. This
classification leaves us with an equal
number of banks within each of the three
categories.13, 14 In addition, separating
the sample firms into different size classes
is also warranted by the overt focus on
productivity change.
Among the bank-specific variables, it is
observed that on average, banks in the
medium category tend to have relatively
higher non-performing loans than those in
the other two size classes, whereas capi-
talisation, on average, tends to be highest
in the small banks. Of greater interest is
the fact that small banks tend to have more
priority sector loans than large/medium
ones, with the latter making up the short-
fall through other loans. Return on assets
tend to be larger for smaller firms, attesting
a negative relation between size and return
on assets; the same is however negative
for medium-sized firms. Among the pro-
ductivity measures, it is found that in
consonance with widely held beliefs, there
is a general trend that larger firms, on
average, have higher productivity, irre-
spective of whether productivity is mea-
sured in terms of economic growth objec-
tive or alternately, economic growth with
stability considerations. As regards regu-
latory variables, while RPHCRAR tends
to be higher for the small banks,
RPLCRAR, on the other hand, is higher
in the large banks. Since RPHCRAR iden-
tifies banks subject to high regulatory
pressure, which would be the case for
relatively undercapitalised banks, this
would seem to suggest that a greater
concentration of such banks in the ‘small’
category. A similar logic applies to the
RPLCRAR variable. Finally, the regula-
tory pressure for NPA is high (RPHNPA)
for the medium bank; the same is the
lowest for large banks. This would seem
to suggest that large banks are more
efficient in pro-actively managing their bad
assets vis-a-vis medium ones.
Based on the aforesaid discussion, one
can postulate a simultaneous equation
system comprising of three linear equa-
tions, representing the empirical model to
be estimated in the study. Accordingly, we
postulate two sets of equations, wherein
the first set is as under:
NNPA = ƒ1 (CRAR, GR1, PRIOL,
ADVGR, ADVGRSQ,
RPHNPA, RPHNPL, TIME
EFFECT DUMMIES)     ...(3)
CRAR = ƒ2 (NNPA, GR1, RoA,
RPHCRAR, RPLCRAR,
SIZE, TIME EFFECT
DUMMIES)                ...(4)
GR1 = ƒ3 (NNPA, CRAR, ADVGR,
ADVGRSQ, GOVT)       ...(5)
where, NNPA=net non-performing loan to
net advances; CRAR= capital to risk-asset
ratio; GR1= index of productivity as mea-
sured by economic growth; PRIOL= ratio
of loans given to priority sector to total
loans; ADVGR= annual growth rate of
total loans; ADVGRSQ = square of
ADVGR; RPHi, (i = NPA, CRAR) and
RPLi, (i = NPA, CRAR) = regulatory pres-
sure variables with respect to asset quality
and capital adequacy, respectively;
RoA = return on asset (defined as net profit
to total asset); SIZE = log of total assets;
GOVT = Government ownership, defined
as a dummy variable which equals 1 in
the particular year (and all subsequent
years) in which the bank has made an
equity offering and zero, otherwise;
T = time effect dummy = one for year t,
zero otherwise.
In equations (3) and (4), PRODUCTIV-
ITY tests the effects of operating perfor-
mance on risk-taking. Under moral hazard
hypothesis, inefficient firms run by en-
trenched management are postulated to be
more prone to risk-taking due to the lower
value of their charters. Hence, PRODUC-
TIVITY is expected to have a positive
effect on the amount of bad loans and a
negative effect on the level of capital.
However, under the hypothesis that inef-
ficient firms are subject to stricter regu-
latory scrutiny and consequently, have less
flexibility to pursue riskier activities,
PRODUCTIVITY could be expected to
have a negative effect on NNPA and a
positive effect on CAPITAL.
Equation (5) examines the effect of
risk-taking on productivity. Credit riskEconomic and Political Weekly February 2, 2002 444
management involves controlling adverse
selection problems by screening loan
applicants as well as tackling moral
hazard problems through closer and con-
tinuous loan monitoring. Depending on
the efficacy of utilisation of resources to
manage the risk, the costs of controlling
credit risk may increase with the level of
risk exposure due to monitoring and
hedging costs, implying a positive relation
between NNPA and productivity. On the
contrary, if costs of credit risk manage-
ment decrease with the level of risk ex-
posure (for example, due to credit screen-
ing), the relationship between NNPA and
PRODUCTIVITY might well turn out to
be negative.
In the second set of equations, ceteris
paribus, we replace the variable GR1 with
GR2, reflecting the fact as to what extent
commercial banks are able to internalise
the objective of the Reserve Bank of India
(of financial stability) in their pursuit for
growth.
V V V V V
Results  and  Discussion Results  and  Discussion Results  and  Discussion Results  and  Discussion Results  and  Discussion
The simultaneous equations system is
fitted by pooled time-series, cross-section
observations using the two-stage least
squares procedure separately for each size
class. The estimation results for (1) to (3)
are presented in Tables 3-5, respectively.
NNPA: The explanatory power for the
NNPA equation in reasonably high, rang-
ing from 88 to 96 per cent (Table 3). CRAR
is found to have a significant and negative
effect on asset quality for PSBs in totality.
This implies that PSBs as a whole, rela-
tively more capital (lower leverage) tends
to be associated with less credit risk. To
the extent that greater financial leverage
tends to have a positive effect on credit
risk, the findings lend credence to the fact
that the two types of risks tend to reinforce
each other. Second, contrary to widely
held beliefs, loans to priority sector does
not necessarily lead to high NNPA, espe-
cially for small banks. As observed earlier,
loans to priority sector are subject to regu-
latory stipulation: banks have to advance
of 40 per cent of their net demand and time
liabilities to this sector; the shortfall hav-
ing to be dovetailed to bonds of select
financial institutions. To the extent that
small banks are not able to meet the stipu-
lations, they tend to invest the same in risk-
free bonds of select institutions, which
would then imply an inverse relationship
between NNPA and priority sector loans.
Table  3:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  3:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  3:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  3:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  3:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation
(Dependent  Variable:  NNPA) Dependent  Variable:  NNPA) Dependent  Variable:  NNPA) Dependent  Variable:  NNPA) Dependent  Variable:  NNPA)
Large Medium Small A l l
Intercept 7.997* 2.946 16.048* 10.900*
(0.783) (5.901) (3.185) (1.332)
CRAR -0.007 -0.193 -0.052 -0.078***
(0.030) (0.123) (0.047) (0.028)
G R 1 -0.010 5.635 -4.196** -1.668***
(0.402) (5.659) (2.012) (1.026)
PRIOL 0.021 0.037 -0.073** 0.002
(0.014) (0.059) (0.041) (0.014)
ADVGR -0.045** -0.078 -0.067*** -0.068*
(0.021) (0.080) (0.039) (0.022)
ADVGRSQ 0.001** 0.002 0.001 0.002*
(0.0007) (0.002) (0.0008) (0.0005)
RPHNPA 139.388* 166.166* 142.277* 176.552*
(6.69) (24.684) (14.516) (6.229)
RPLNPA -32.085* -25.769* -18.172* -18.843*
(1.824) (5.617) (1.383) (1.125)
T -0.014 -0.024 0.152** 0.026
(0.036) (0.180) (0.068) (0.043)
Adjusted  R2 0.967 0.889 0.934 0.953
Notes: Figures  in  brackets  indicate  standard  errors.
*,  **  and  ***  indicate  significance  at  1,  5  and  10  per  cent,  respectively.
Table  4:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  4:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  4:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  4:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  4:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation
(Dependent  Variable:  CRAR) Dependent  Variable:  CRAR) Dependent  Variable:  CRAR) Dependent  Variable:  CRAR) Dependent  Variable:  CRAR)
Large Medium Small A l l
Intercept 5.111** 30.161** 16.232** 14.908**
(2.413) (22.864 (7.256) (7.481)
NNPA -0.064 -0.058 -0.229*** -0.159**
(0.060) (0.240) (0.126) (0.082)
G R 1 -0.237 -6.884 14.106 -4.569
(0.952) (31.308) (10.399) (7.292)
R O A 0.559 2.732** 0.321 1.867*
(0.471) (1.286) (0.316) (0.468)
RPHCRAR 99.187* 105.191 139.399* 108.537*
(10.082) (136.349) (18.061) (17.303)
RPLCRAR -2.135* 5.587 16.649 1.180
(0.214) (15.462) (19.767) (1.290)
SIZE 0.202 -1.797 -2.858*** -0.268
(0.192) (2.182) (1.601) (0.290)
T 0.359* 0.429 0.809* 0.251***
(0.068) (0.585) (0.297) (0.144)
Adjusted  R2 0.907 0.597 0.715 0.644
Notes: Figures  in  brackets  indicate  standard  errors.
*,  **  and  ***  indicate  significance  at  1,  5  and  10  per  cent,  respectively.
Table  5:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  5:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  5:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  5:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  5:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation
(Dependent  Variable:  GR1) Dependent  Variable:  GR1) Dependent  Variable:  GR1) Dependent  Variable:  GR1) Dependent  Variable:  GR1)
Large Medium Small A l l
Intercept 1.944* 1.078* 1.183* 1.371*
(0.399) (0.183) (0.141) (0.150)
NNPA -0.027 0.002 -0.005 -0.011
(0.028) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
CRAR -0.008 0.019** 0.004 0.009
(0.028) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
ADVGR -0.036* -0.013 -0.012** -0.021*
(0.019) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
ADVGRSQ 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0003**
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GOVT -0.223*** -0.008 0.050 -0.073
(0.133) (0.101) (0.041) (0.051)
Adjusted  R2 0.135 0.039 0.065 0.065
Notes: Figures  in  brackets  indicate  standard  errors.
*,  **  and  ***  indicate  significance  at  1,  5  and  10  per  cent,  respectively.Economic and Political Weekly February 2, 2002 445
Third, the coefficient on ADVGR is
negative and statistically significant for
large as well as small banks, pointing to
the fact that for these banks, loan growth
has a negative effect on bad loans, possibly
because of their superior credit risk man-
agement techniques. Juxtaposed with the
fact that the coefficient on ADVGRSQ
being positive for large banks, this finding
suggests that the relationship between non-
performing loans and loan growth is in-
verse U-shaped. As regards regulatory
pressure, it is observed that RPHNPA is
significant across all bank groups at con-
ventional levels of significance. It seems
that banks subject to high regulatory pres-
sure as regards NPAs will attempt to
‘gamble for resurrection’: increasing their
loan growth in order to raise profits, which
in turn, might engender high NPA levels,
implying a positive relation between NNPA
and RPHNPA. On the contrary, banks with
NPAs below the stipulated benchmark will
possibly adopt a cautious approach as
regards credit sanction in an attempt to
curb fresh build up of NPAs, so that low
regulatory pressure induces banks across
all categories to reduce NPAs.
The important aspect of the finding is
with regard to productivity change. When
the objective of economic growth is taken
as a surrogate for productivity, the results
seem to suggest that higher productivity
leads to a drop in net NPAs, especially
for small banks. The flexibility of small
banks in loan sanctioning and monitoring
implies that they are better able to manage
their bad assets, reflected in the inverse
relation between NNPA and GR1.
CRAR: The explanatory power on capi-
tal equation is significant but with high
variability, with the adjusted R2 ranging
from a low of 60 per cent for medium-sized
banks to a high of 91 per cent for large
banks. The coefficient on NNPA is nega-
tive and statistically significant for banks
in the small-size class, reiterating the
mutually reinforcing relation between
credit risk and financial leverage. Bank
size (SIZE) and CRAR tend to be nega-
tively related for the small banks, attesting
to the limited scale effects emanating from
bank operations. Finally, capitalisation is
driven positively by RoA and is significant
at conventional levels of significance only
for medium banks.
Of particular interest are the regulatory
pressure variables, RPHCRAR and
RPLCRAR. Since RPHCRAR captures
banks with low capital adequacy, which
does not meet the regulatory minimum
Table  6:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  6:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  6:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  6:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  6:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation
(Dependent  Variable:  NNPA) Dependent  Variable:  NNPA) Dependent  Variable:  NNPA) Dependent  Variable:  NNPA) Dependent  Variable:  NNPA)
Large Medium Small A l l
Intercept 7.384* 4.831 15.309* 10.967*
(1.009) (3.906) (3.312) (1.361)
CRAR 0.010 -0.175* -0.039 -0.077*
(0.037) (0.099) (0.055) (0.029)
G R 2 0.341 4.082 -3.498*** -1.621***
(0.479) (3.873) (1.982) (0.985)
PRIOL 0.022 0.024 -0.075*** 0.0006
(0.015) (0.053) (0.046) (0.015)
ADVGR -0.044*** -0.078 -0.067*** -0.067*
(0.023) (0.070) (0.042) (0.022)
ADVGRSQ 0.001*** 0.002 0.001 0.002*
(0.0007) (0.002) (0.0009) (0.0006)
RPHNPA 139.177* 168.416* 143.926* 175.902*
(7.083) (20.831) (15.334) (6.364)
RPLNPA -32.179* -25.099* -18.497* -18.944*
(1.977) (4.731) (1.545) (1.153)
T -0.011 0.008 0.116*** -0.0004
(0.039) (0.164) (0.070) (0.047)
Adjusted  R2 0.961 0.915 0.927 0.951
Notes: Figures  in  brackets  indicate  standard  errors.
 *,  **  and  ***  indicate  significance  at  1,  5  and  10  per  cent,  respectively.
Table  7:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  7:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  7:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  7:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  7:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation
(Dependent  Variable:  CRAR) Dependent  Variable:  CRAR) Dependent  Variable:  CRAR) Dependent  Variable:  CRAR) Dependent  Variable:  CRAR)
Large Medium Small A l l
Intercept 4.819*** 24.851 15.994* 10.204
(2.679) (15.390) (5.097) (7.003)
NNPA -0.071 -0.118 -0.205** -0.187**
(0.054) (0.183) (0.090) (0.069)
G R 2 -0.060 3.091 6.178 0.349
(1.021) (15.315) (4.848) (6.405)
R O A 0.504 2.333** 0.399*** 1.605*
(0.448) (0.969) (0.223) (0.477)
RPHCRAR 99.660* 65.314 133.766* 111.279*
(11.214) (77.278) (12.906) (16.746)
RPLCRAR -2.157* 0.994 3.733 -1.912
(0.205) (10.643) (10.632) (1.078)***
SIZE 0.218 -2.303 -1.835** -0.338
(0.189) (1.745) (0.876) (0.256)
T 0.355* 0.582 0.700* 0.285***
(0.066) (0.591) (0.204) (0.189)
Adjusted  R2 0.911 0.637 0.840 0.704
Notes: Figures  in  brackets  indicate  standard  errors.
*  ,  **  and  ***  indicate  significance  at  1,  5  and  10  per  cent,  respectively.
Table  8:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  8:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  8:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  8:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation Table  8:  Two-stage  Least-squares  Regression  Estimates  of  Equation
(Dependent  Variable:  GR2) Dependent  Variable:  GR2) Dependent  Variable:  GR2) Dependent  Variable:  GR2) Dependent  Variable:  GR2)
Large Medium Small A l l
Intercept 2.144* 1.041* 1.217* 1.427*
(0.404) (0.197) (0.166) (0.158)
NNPA -0.031* 0.003 -0.005 -0.013
(0.028) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
CRAR -0.021 0.022** 0.008 0.009
(0.028) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
ADVGR -0.039** -0.013 -0.019* -0.024*
(0.019) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
ADVGRSQ 0.0006 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0004**
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GOVT -0.218 -0.019 0.033** -0.089***
(0.135) (0.109) (0.048) (0.051)
Adjusted  R2 0.169 0.051 0.112 0.084
Notes: Figures  in  brackets  indicate  standard  errors.
*,  **  and  ***  indicate  significance  at  1,  5  and  10  per  cent,  respectively.Economic and Political Weekly February 2, 2002 446Economic and Political Weekly February 2, 2002 447
risk-based standards, they should have a
positive effect on capital ratios. In Table 3,
the parameter estimate on RPHCRAR is
positive and significant for banks in the
large and small categories, with the coef-
ficient on RPHCRAR equal to 99.187 and
139.399, respectively. This would suggest
that large and small banks in the inad-
equately capitalised category are under
considerable regulatory pressure to increase
their capital ratios. At the other end of the
spectrum, as regards RPLCRAR, the co-
efficient is statistically significant only for
the ‘large’ category banks, the magnitude
of the coefficient being equal to –2.135.
This would attest to the fact that the large,
adequately capitalised banks tend to lower
their capital ratios in response to regula-
tory pressure.
GR1: The explanatory power of the GR1
equation is the lowest among the three
equations, with the adjusted R2 ranging
from a low of 3 per cent to a high of 13
per cent. Thus a non-linear relationship
between productivity and other variables
is not ruled out. Here, the coefficient on
CRAR is positive and significant for
medium-sized banks. This would testify
that for the category of medium banks,
those with more capital tend to have higher
productivity than those with less capital.
Finally, coming to the critical issue of
government ownership, the results support
that productivity tends to improve with
lower government ownership for the large
banks.
On the other hand, if growth is measured
in terms of the ability of the commercial
banks to satisfy the objectives of the central
bank (i e, growth with stability), the results
of the analysis are presented in Tables 6,
7 and 8, respectively. The results of
Table 6 are virtually the same as in Table 3,
and confirm the fact that higher produc-
tivity leads to a reduction in NPA, espe-
cially for small banks. This might be at-
tributable to the fact that these banks are
able to successfully incorporate the objec-
tives of the central tends into their profit
maximising behaviour. It is also observed
that greater capitalisation has a dampening
influence on credit risk, especially for
medium banks, supporting the mutually
reinforcing relationship between capital
and credit risk.
In a similar vein, the results of Table 7
virtually mimic the results of Table 4. As
with the earlier table, the mutually rein-
forcing interrelation between leverage and
credit risk is evidenced from the sign on
the NNPA coefficient for small banks,
with the magnitude of the coefficient being
virtually the same as when growth objec-
tive is considered in isolation. Unlike the
earlier case, capitalisation is driven posi-
tively by RoA, not only for medium, but
also for small banks as well.
As regards productivity, there are three
salient features as reported in Table 8.
First, as in earlier case, it is observed that
higher capital leads to a rise in productivity
for medium-sized banks. Secondly, for the
large and small banks in particular, higher
loan growth translates into lower produc-
tivity. These categories of banks might be
less equipped to handle the objective of
economic growth while securing financial
stability, and to that extent, for these classes
of banks, the results suggest decreasing
returns to loan growth on productivity.
Finally, increased government ownership
tends to increase productivity, especially
in the small-sized PSBs. These results run
contrary to Caprio and Peria Martinez
(2000), who find increased government
ownership a deterrent to the development
of the banking system.
V I V I V I V I V I
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
The purpose of the present article has
been to understand the interrelationships
between risk-taking and productivity in
the state-owned banking system in India.
As pointed out earlier, the PSBs are tra-
ditionally government-owned and to that
extent, it is deemed as essential to under-
stand the relation between risk, capital and
productivity, especially in the context of
a dominantly government-owned banking
system. While it is found that higher pro-
ductivity leads to a decrease in credit risk,
it has a positive influence on bank capi-
talisation as well. This supports the fact
that poor performers are more prone to risk
taking than better-performing banking
organisations. The positive effect of pro-
ductivity on capital is attributable to regu-
latory pressure, especially for banks which
fall short of the prescribed minimum capital
adequacy standards. Finally, our analysis
supports the fact that productivity, capital
and risk taking tend to be jointly deter-
mined, reinforcing and compensating
each other.
Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
1 The number has since been reduced to 19, with
the merger of two state-owned banks in 1993.
2 As at end-December 2001, the cash reserve
ratio was 5.5 per cent (statutory minimum of
3 per cent) and the statutory liquidity ratio was
25 per cent (the legal minimum). The
corresponding figures as at end-March 1994
were 14.0 per cent and 34.25 per cent,
respectively.
3 The number has since been revised upwards
to 12 per cent in 1996.
4 The State Bank of India (SBI) was fully owned
by the RBI and the 7 associates of SBI were
fully owned by SBI itself.
5 Defined as assets of top five public sector
banks to total assets of the 27 public sector
banks.
6 The five largest banks (in terms of asset) are
in the public sector.
7 As at end-March 2001, loans and government
securities comprised 78 per cent of total assets
of PSBs. The corresponding figures as at end-
March 1996 was 73 per cent.
8 Net non-performing loans is measured as gross
non-performing loans less (1) balance in interest
suspense account, (ii) claims by deposit
insurance and credit guarantee corporation
and kept in suspense account, (iii) part payment
received and kept in suspense account, and,
(iv) total provisions held.
9 The subscript ‘0’ has been used to indicate
that output-oriented Malmquist index has been
computed in our study. Note that input-oriented
Malmquist TFP indices can also be defined
in a similar way to the output-oriented measures
presented in the present study (Grosskopf,
1993).
10 In terms of Section 17 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949, every banking company
incorporated in India is required to create a
reserve fund and transfer a sum equivalent to
not less than 25 per cent of its disclosed profits
to the reserve fund, every year.
11 Up to end-March 1999, SOBs had to comply
with a CRAR of 8 per cent. This ratio has been
raised to 9 per cent effective April 1, 2000.
12 For banks with risk based capital ratios less
than 8 per cent, (1/CRAR-1/8) was positive.
Therefore, a positive value implies that greater
regulatory pressure, as measured by
RPLCRAR, correspond to larger increases in
the capital ratio. A similar argument can be
applied for RPHCRAR.
13 While there has been a movement within
classes in terms of bank assets, there has been
no movement from one class to another, so
that this has left us with the same number of
banks within each size class over the sample
period.
14 The banks within each size class in alphabetical
order are: ‘Large’ (Bank of Baroda, Bank of
India, Canara Bank, Central Bank of India,
Indian Overseas Bank, Punjab National Bank,
State Bank of India, Syndicate Bank and Union
Bank of India,); ‘Medium’ (Allahabad Bank,
Andhra Bank, Bank of Maharashtra, Dena
Bank, Indian Bank, State Bank of Hyderabad,
State Bank of Patiala, United Bank of India
and United Commercial Bank,) and ‘Small’
(Corporation Bank, Oriental Bank of
Commerce, Punjab and Sind Bank, State Bank
of Bikaner and Jaipur, State Bank of Indore,
State Bank of Mysore, State Bank of Saurashtra,
State Bank of Travancore and Vijaya Bank.
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A  selection  of  essays  presenting  the  main  strands  in  the  debate  on
industrialisation  in  India.  The  contributors  analyse  the  factors  underlying
the  deceleration  in  industrial  growth  from  the  mid-1960s  to  the  mid-
1970s  and  discuss  the  conditions  and  policies  for  a  return  to  the  path
of  sustained  growth.  Alternative  hypotheses  about  the  macroeconomic
determinants  of  and  constraints  on  industrial  growth  in  India  are
examined,  focusing  on  the  performance  of  the  agricultural  sector,
intersectoral  terms  of  trade  between  agriculture  and  industry,
disproportionalities  within  and  between  sectors,  the  level  of  investment
in  the  economy,  the  nexus  between  public  and  private  investment
and  the  relative  significance  of  supply  and  demand  constraints.
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While  there  has  been,  over  the  years,  a  perceptible  increase  in  per
capita  income  and  expenditure  and  possibly  some  decline  in  the
incidence  of  poverty  in  India,  what  still  remains  is  massive  and  of
a  kind  that  is  not  remedied  quickly  or  smoothly.  Even  with  radical
policies,  the  shifts  in  income  and  occupational  structures  to  make
a  serious  dent  on  it  will  take  more  than  the  rest  of  this  century.  In
the  welter  of  recent  exchanges  between  the  government  and  the
opposition  as  well  as  between  planners  and  market  advocates  on
the  strategy  of  growth,  these  issues  have  been  largely  obfuscated.
It  is  therefore  more  than  ever  necessary  today  to  recognise  the
magnitude  of  the  problem  and  the  inadequacy  of  the  measures
adopted  so  far  to  deal  with  it.
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